Zuidema doctrine

The Zuidema doctrine is a developed in Tiperyn shortly following the Grand Campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s. It placed a heavy emphasis on the use of naval power as a means of projecting conventional military land and air forces onto contested land, as well as the use of socio-political forces to disrupt the enemy's industry, supply lines, and control over its population.

The theory is named for its main proponent, Lieutenant General Olrik Zuidema, who was the commander of the Tiperyn IV Corps during the war. This corps fought in Western Artemia and was most notably responsible for the Urrunaga landings in modern day Boaga that saw the breaking of the stalemate on the Agranan Front. The war in Western Artemia was the first time the Tiperyn military carried out contested amphibious entries, used dedicated warships to launch and recover aircraft, and incited civil unrest in an enemy state to bring about the end of conventional conflict.

By the end of the Grand Campaigns, Tiperyn was shifting from a declining colonial power towards a great power in its own right. The shock of the Grand Campaigns was convenient for the mavericks within the Tiperyn military establishment as it confirmed many of their ideas of warfare which, while hypothesized, had never been practiced in an armed conflict by Tiperyn. The writings of Zuidema and company were a distinct change from previous Tiperyn military thinking, which did not synthesize naval and land power (and did not consider air power whatsoever). Rather, they suggested that the battles at sea and on land were separate phases of one continuous fight. It was acknowledged that every land fight Tiperyn would fight in the future would begin at sea.

Sea-Land Operation
At the core of the Zuidema doctrine is the intergration of warships, naval air power, and ground forces to fight on continuous and offensive battle. Although the Realm Armada (navy) would need to still focus on the sea control, this was envisioned as a means to enable the land battle. This meant investments would had to be made in the Realm Armada's sealift capacity, as well as specialized platforms for delivering amphibious infantry during forced entry. At the beginning of Tiperyn's involvement in the Grand Campaigns, most of Tiperyn's analogous capbility consisted of troop transports meant for administratively transporting troops between ports. Dedicated amphibious warfare warships would be necessary to increase the tempo of amphibious operations, mass more troops along specific sections of coast, and adequately support troops on the ground. Aggressiveness was paramount, according to Zuidema, because initial amphibious invasion forces would be left vulnerable if they dug in rather than maintaining their momentum. By slowing their rate of advance, surprise would be lost and initiative would be transferred to the enemy who would have enough time to concentrate forces to counterattack.

Zuidema envisioned the Sea-Land Operation to be split into five distinct phases: the battle for sea control, the preparation of the landing area, the landing and initial penetration, the breakout, and the exploitation. In this way, Zuidema doctrine is similar conceptually to, but with the addition of amphibious warfare elements. The battle for sea control synthesized pre-Grand Campaigns doctrine with new technologies and methods that developed during the war, such as the dedicated aircraft carriers which were initially used by Tiperyn for scouting, gunspotting, anti-submarine warfare, and torpedo bombing. Once sea supremacy was achieved, the fleet — aided by naval aviation — would ascertain the most opportune area to land. Zuidema believe that strongpoints should be avoided and that prepatory naval gunfire should be held until the last possible moment to maintain the element of surprise. Further, while not always practicable due to its complexity, Zuidema believed that in the future, landing forces would have to be relatively flexible so they could land suddenly in the most advantageous positions. This would be to make the initial penetration as bloodless as possible, bypass enemy troop concentrations and fortifications, and keep the enemy of his back foot.

Initial landings would be rapidly followed by a breakout consisting of more marine infantry and armored cars supported by aviation and artillery. The tactical breakout would then enable an operational exploitation, where high-speed forces composed principally of armored cars and car or truckborne infantry advancing deep into the enemy's rear areas towards their operational objectives.

Socio-Political Warfare
During the Grand Campaigns, Tiperyn successfully brought about the rapid defeat of Teutonic military forces through the incitement and support of a communist revolution. This experience was defined by Zuidema as "socio-political warfare" and as a way of war which could be used in certain circumstances. The core aim would be to use political forces — supplementary to military capabilities — to disrupt the enemy's rear areas. This tenet essentially implicitly defined the enemy's population as a key that could be targetted both to reduce the enemy's economic strength and act as  for Tiperyn military forces. "'Whenever possible, the indigenous population of a hostile regime should be considered a force multiplier whenever possible. This will not be possible in all conflicts, and takes a significant investment of time. But, instead of spending bombs and men to deny the enemy their means to wage war — their supply lines, their factories, their manpower — it is far preferable to spend political capital to organically grow insurrection at no cost to the Tiperyn fighter.'"

Universal battle car concept
Although Tiperyn military theorists generally believed in the specialization of ground combat vehicles to be preferable to ensure high performance in the field, it was accepted that a focus on expeditionary amphibious warfare would be heavily limited by shipping. This not only limited the number of total vehicles could be landed initially and their weight, but also place limits on the number or variety of spare parts that could sustain the force. Thus, the design of military vehicles was limited from the 1930s onward to allow for the use of as few platforms in as many roles as possible.

By the end of the Grand Campaigns, the Tiperyn military establishment had largely discounted the it trialled on the Agranan front as largely unnecessary. It did not see a great need for armored infantry support during the breakthrough phase of a conventional operation, as infantry supported by artillery had proven to be perfectly capable of doing so elsewhere on the Western Artemian front. Thus, armored cars operated by the Ruitery Corps had emerged supreme for their key role during the exploitation and pursuit of the enemy.

However, the calculus had changed with the introduction of amphibious warfare as a key part of Tiperyn doctrine. Zuidema argued that while heavy and slow armored vehicles were not necessary during the initial phases of a normal offensive, marine infantry would be in need of mobile support artillery to be landed with them. The aggressiveness of Zuidema's amphibious offensive necessitated as much firepower being brought to bear by landing parties as possible to quickly overcome the enemy's defense. While naval gunfire could give direct support to landing parties, it was believed that self-propelled guns with machine guns would be more responsive and be potentially superior in certain scenarios. Vehicles supporting infantry during this phase would necessarily have to be more protected than platforms in the field at the time as the likelihood of engagement by accurate enemy machine guns, mortars and infantry guns was high. They would also need to have better offroad capabilities to cope with sandy beaches during initial landings. At the same time, armored cars with similar capabilities to ones already in service would be needed during exploitation (Heavy Ruitery) and reconnaissance/screening (Light Ruitery).

As discussed earlier, the Realm Armada Fleet Expeditionary and Realm Guard were hesitant to continue to introduce several platforms optimized for specific tasks. The prior was hesitant because they were cognizant of their own service's limitations, while the latter knew in order to stay relevent it had to make itself mold to Realm Armada capabilities. The result was the "universal battle car" concept. This platform would be an armored car with protection against rifle fire and shrapnel, an armament including either a mortar or infantry gun and machine guns, somewhat better off-road capabilities, and no worse speed and radius of action on road. This requirement would be realized in 1935 with the introduction of the Kanonvein «Krait» (literally "Krait Gun Car") as a universal battle car that would replace a number of designs in service for exploitation, pursuit, reconnaissance, convoy escort, and direct infantry support.

The introduction of the Krait had a number of implications. First, when tanks were introduced in the 1940s, the Tiperyn military adapted to a universal tank doctrine fairly quickly — although it initially put both a medium and light tank into service. The III Heavy Ruitery Corps and II Light Ruitery Corps garrisoned in Nasiria were the recipients of Tiperyn's first tracked armored fighting vehicles since the experiments with gun tractors on the Agranan front during the Grand Campaigns. This was due to that environment's harsh terrain — soft sand in the north and mountainous regions in the south — which Tiperyn armored cars were not adapted to. Over the course of the Great Kesh War, Tiperyn's tank fleet simplified down to one "main battle tank" similar to its universal battle car in concept, although vastly more capable.

Second, the Krait ultimately accelerated the decline of the Ruitery Corps' monopoly over armored fighting vehicles in the Realm Guard. While it had maintained this through the Grand Campaigns as armored cars had been employed principally in cavalry-type roles, the addition of infantry support and, later, anti-tank combat to the platform's roles initially meant that the infantry and artillery soon would operate their own armored cars (the latter receiving specialized variants built on the same chassis, like mortar carriers and tank destroyers). The Fleet Expeditionary meanwhile created an entirely new specialty corps for the use of armored cars which would engage in all roles earmarked for them. Following the Great Kesh War, with the Mamba main battle tank being selected to replace all armored cars in Tiperyn service, a new branch within the Realm Guard — the Armor Corps — absorbed the Heavy Ruitery Corps and armored car units within the Rifleer Corps. The Light Ruitery Corps would be renamed just the Ruitery Corps and would continue to fulfill light cavalry tasks such as screening and reconnaissance, while breakthrough, exploitation, and infantry support roles were transferred to the new Armor Corps.

Naval aviation
The realities of future warfare, likely to be far away from Tiperyn's shores or friendly airfields, necessitated the rapid expansion of the Realm Armada's aviation and the production of aircraft carriers. The perceived need for aircraft carriers during the early- and mid-20th century is why Tiperyn has the most decommissioned aircraft carriers in the world. During the Grand Campaigns, Tiperyn primarily employed converted aircraft carriers in the scouting and anti-submarine warfare role. With the advent of air-launched torpedos, purpose-made torpedo bombers were also added to aircraft carrier air groups by the end of the war. However, naval confrontation with Chezzetcook in the 1920s after the Grand Campaigns brought about a new line of thinking for the drivers of naval aviation. During that conflict, Tiperyn was able to maintain its naval blockade of Airgialla against Chezzetcooker warships through the use of land-based bombers which were able to target and destroy a number of enemy ships.

This caused a number of reactions from the Tiperyn Admiralty Board. First, the Realm Armada — who had traditionally been the branch responsible for combat against enemy warships — outlined an immediate need for land-based maritime bombers, as Realm Aero Service bombers originally designed for tactical and strategic ground bombing had to be used initially. Second, Tiperyn's victory brought attention to the overbearing threat land-based aviation had against naval forces. Thus, more capable and longer range fighters were needed to extend the range of the aircraft carrier's combat air patrols and defend against high-payload, long-range bombers. This is largely the same conclusion that Chezzetcook on the receiving end of Tiperyn's bombers took away from the engagement. Third, it was acknowledged that in the wars Tiperyn believed it would be fighting far from its own shores, the Realm Armada would not be able to support its fleets or marine ground forces with maritime strike aircraft or tactical bombers unless they were carrier-based. Thus, the board defined new requirements for carrier-based strike aircraft that were heavier and more versatile than their fleet of dive bombers and torpedo bombers at the time. Although not fully realized until the 1950s, this outlook established the Realm Armada's Air Service as the most capable air force in the Tiperyn Realm Defence, despite the separate Realm Aero Service having ended the Grand Campaigns with the more advanced aircraft.

The initial need for high-capability combat air patrol fighters and carrier-based maritime/ground strike aircraft and its effect on the overall doctrine can still be founded today in the Ares Gryphon air superiority fighter and Ares Trident multirole strike aircraft respectively.